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ENARGEIA: A CONCEPT FOR ALL SEASONS
DENNIS R. BORMANN
Department of Speech Communication
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 68588

INTRODUCTION
Aristotle, writing in the fourth century B.C., defmed
rhetoric as the "faculty of discovering in the particular case
what are the available means of persuasion" (Aristotle, 1932,
1:2). He then proceeded to classify proofs intrinsic to the art
of speaking into three modes-logos, ethos, and pathos.
Consistent with his ''scientific'' point of view, he deplored
writers of the arts of speaking who ignored argument; and his
treatise emphasized the logical element in persuasion. As he
said, persuasion is "effected by the arguments, when we
demonstrate the truth, real or apparent, by such means as
inhere in particular cases" (Aristotle, 1 :2). That the purpose
of much public, popular discourse throughout the ages has
been to persuade or convince is obvious. However, the question of how the speaker or writer is to establish belief in his
proposition and, in addition, appeal to the emotional and,
imaginative side of his audience has offered much scope for
theorizing among rhetoricians. Naturally, as conceptions of
human knowledge and human nature changed, theories of
suasory discourse changed, too. Not all later rhetoricians
agreed with Aristotle that enthymematic reasoning formed
the body and substance of persuasion.
The ancient-rhetorical notion of enargeia (clearness,
distinctness, vividness), however, played a very influential
role in many theoretical discussions among later thinkers.
literary critics and aestheticians also considered enargeia as
a quality of writing that could arouse emotions and give
aesthetic pleasure. Finally, enargeia was revived by Descartes
and the Cartesians as a criterion of truth and played a prominent role in philosophic discussions in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
ENARGEIA IN RHETORICAL AND
UTERARY THEORY
The Greeks were the first to offer a theory of imaginative appeal which, they thought, could produce the desired
response in a listener or reader. Although Aristotle stressed
the enthymeme as an engine of persuasion, he was keenly
aware of the functional, rhetorical effect of language on listeners. In Book III of the Rhetoric, he considers linguistic
devices which promote vivid description and lively or popular
sayings. He claims that audiences like words ''that set an event
before their eyes; for they must see the thing occurring now,

not hear of it as in the future. In style, accordingly, the
speaker must aim at these three points: Metaphor, Antithesis, Actuality" (Aristotle, 3 :10). Metaphors, he claims,
give liveliness and vividness to composition. He puts particular
emphasis on placing objects before the mind's eye as tp.ough
they were living and moving. He writes, "But we have still to
explain what is meant by setting things 'before the eyes,'
and how this is to be affected. What I mean is, using expressions that show things in a state of activity. It is a metaphor,
indeed, to say that a good man is 'four-square,' ... but the
metaphor suggests no activity. There is, on the other hand, a
sense of activity in the expression 'with his vigor fully blooming' " (Aristotle, 3:11). Thus, we fmd in the Aristotelian
treatment of rhetorical style an emphasis on linguistic devices
which promote vivid description and a lively .or vivid representation of the facts. The orator is to set things before the
audience's eyes; he is to paint verbal pictures.
The great Roman rhetorician, Quintillian (1960, 6.2:
29-30), clearly stated the relationship between vivid description (or enargeia) and emotional arousal which also contributes to belief in the reality or actuality of the scene being
described.
But how are we to generate these emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our own power?
I will try to explain as best I may. There are
certain experiences ... the Romans [call] visions,
whereby things absent are present to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem
actually to be before our very eyes. It is the man
who is really sensitive to such impressions who
will have the greatest power over the emotions ....
This power of vivid imagination, whereby things,
words and actions are presented in the most realistic manner . . . is a power which all may readily
acquire if they will. When the mind is unoccupied
or is absorbed by fantastic hopes or daydreams, we
are haunted by these visions of which I am speaking to such an extent that we imagine that we are
traveling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting, addressing the people, or enjoying the use of wealth that
we do not actually possess, and seem .to ourselves
not to be dreaming but acting. Surely, then, it
may be possible to tum this form of hallucination
to some profit.
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And in a later passage Quintilian (1960,62:32) writes:
"From such impressions arises that enargeia which Cicero
calls illumination and actuality, which make us seem not so
much to narrate as to exhibit the actual s.cene, while our
emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were
present at the actual occurrence." Although Quintilian is
pointing to the emotional efficacy of clear and vivid word
pictures, he also relates enargeia to illumination and actuality.
Next, I would like to turn to another great Greek
critic, probably of the same century as Quintilian, whose
writings belong to the poetic as well as the rhetorical tradition-i.e., Longinus. In the fifteenth chapter of On the Sublime, Longinus talks of enargeia. He is discussing the second of
his five sources of sublimity, viz., vehement and inspired
passion. Longinus (1962 :2) says that in his time the word
imagination
has now come to be used predOminantly of passages where, inspired by strong emotion, you seem
to see what you describe and bring it vividly
before the eyes of your audience. That imagination means one thing in oratory and another in
poetry you will yourself detect, and also that the
object of poetry is to enthrall, of prose writing to
present things vividly, though both aim at this
latter and at excited feeling.
After citing some examples from poetry which "show a
romantic exaggeration, far exceeding the limits of credibility ,"
Longinus says that the proper use of imagination in oratory
is to convince the audience of the "reality and truth" of the
speaker's assertions. He quotes passages from Demosthenes
where, he claims, imagination persuades by going beyond
argument: "When combined with argumentative treatment,"
it not only convinces the audience, ''it positively masters
them" (Longinus, 15 :9).
From these few passages in Aristotle, Quintilian, and
Longinus, then, it is clear that the ancient rhetoricians advocated the vivid description of objects, persons, scenes, or
events in discourse. Such concrete verbal portraits, they
thought, could serve at least four important functions: (1)
they aroused the emotions and the passions; (2) they created
aesthetic enjoyment; (3) they helped to hold attention and
interest; and, finally, (4) they even contributed to belief.
Lively and vividly descriptive language can raise the ideas of
the imagination to almost the same vividness of sense impressions. Enargeia can "almost compel the audience to see what
... [the author] imagined" (Longinus, 15:3).
Naturally, in poetic and rhetorical discourse,itis by the
proper use of language-particularly figurative language-that
the writer or speaker must seek to raise the imaginative description to the vividness of actual sense perception. Certain
figures were recommended in rhetorical treatises as partic156

ularly important for such purposes-metaphor, simile, vision,
and ocular demonstration. In Lane Cooper's translation of
Aristotle (1932) there are two figures which are derived from
the Greek doctrine of enargeia: descriptio or vivid description;
and demonstratio or ocular demonstrations: "when an event
is so described in words that the business seems to be enacted
and the subject to pass vividly before our eyes."
Although the notion of vivid description seems to have
originated with the rhetoricians, it was later to become firmly
entrenched in poetic theory, too. One reason for the popularity of descriptive passages in poetry, no doubt, was the .•
Latin notion of ut pictura poesis. Horace had said that poetry
is like painting, and most Renaissance literary critics repeated
the clicM that poetry is like a picture. Because of this parallel
between the arts, it was common to describe the poet's (or
rhetorician's) task in language in terms of painting. If the
verbal arts are similar to painting, then they should be speaking pictures. Thus, the imagery of color came into discussions
of poetic and rhetorical compositions. Writers and speakers
were urged to "paint in living colors," or to "paint before the
eyes," with verbal portraits.
From the time of the early Greeks and Romans, the
advice to speakers and writers was to paint before the eyes
of the audience with clear, distinct, and vivid, verbal portraits. These commonplaces about the importance of ocular
demonstration were repeated throughout the Renaissance and
the seventeenth century in almost all treatises on rhetoric and
poetry. The doctrine of vivid description was very popular in
the eighteenth century. An index to how widespread the notion was can be found in the following passage from Reid
(1969:397-98):
It seems easier to form a lively conception of
objects that are familiar, than of those that are
not; our conceptions of visible objects are commonly the most lively, when other circumstances
are equal. Hence, poets not only delight in the
description of visible objects, but find means by
metaphor, analogy, and allusion, to clothe every
object they describe with visible qualities. The
lively conception of these makes the object to
appear, as it were, before our eyes. Lord Kames,
in his Elements of Criticism, has shown of what
importance it is in works of taste, to give to
objects described, what he calls ideal presence.
To produce this in the mind, is indeed the capital
aim of poetical and rhetorical description. It
carries the man, as it were, out of himself, and
makes him a spectator of the scene described.
This ideal presence seems to me to be nothing
else but a lively conception of the appearance
which the object would make if really present to
the eye.

ENARGEIA IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Having discussed what might be called the rhetorical
and aesthetic aspects of the doctrine of enargeia, I would now
like to consider what might be called the epistemological
dimension of this term and its synonyms. I have already
mentioned that, even among ancient rhetoricians, vivid description was considered one device to convince the audience
of the reality and truth of the orator's statements and to
persuade an audience by getting them to "see before their
eyes" what the speaker wants them to believe.
Although Descartes is often considered the father of
modem philosophy, some recent writers have considered his
system as an attempt to overthrow the doubts of the Sceptics. Descartes proceeded with his method of doubt to look
for an indubitable truth, which he found in his famous Cogito,
ergo sum. By inspecting this one truth, Descartes finds the
criterion of truth. He comes to the conclusion that there is
nothing in the proposition "I think, therefore I am" which
assures him of the truth except that he sees very clearly and
distinctly what is affirmed. Descartes (1965 :29) wrote:
"Certainly in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures
me of its truth, excepting the clear and distinct perception of
that which I state .... And accordingly it seems to me that
already I can establish as a general rule that all things which
I perceive very clearly and very distinctly are true." The
cogito strikes us so strongly with its clarity and distinctness
that we cannot doubt it-it carries its own evidence with it
or is self~vident. (It is interesting to note that Cicero used the
Latin word evidentia for the Greek enargeia.)
Descartes' opponents, of course, often attacked his
system on the matter of clear and distinct truths. "A central
theme of these criticisms [of Gassendi and Mersenne] is to
question whether the fact that Descartes claimed to be certain, to perceive clearly and distinctly that the propositions
he advanced were true, sufficed to make them true. Perhaps,
they suggested, in spite of how Descartes felt about these
propositions, it might still be the case that they were false"
(popkin, 1964:204). In a note to the article on ''Pyrrho''
in Bayle's Dictionary, Popkin (1965 :199) remarks: "In seventeenth-century discussions, l'evidence is the mark of truth,
which, when present, makes it impossible to doubt a proposition. In Fureti~re's Dictionnaire universel (1727 ed.) the
following entries are ,offered to explain the meaning of I'evidence: 'Manifest certainty, the quality of things that makes
them clearly visible and knowable, as much to the body's
eyes as to its mind. The consent which arises from I'evidence
of a thing is more unshakeable than that which faith exacts
(Huet). One has to accept l'evidence, which cannot be resisted as soon as it makes itself felt in us (Le Clerc) ....'"
In these passages it is clear that l'evidence is a synonym
for enargeia, derived, of course, from Cicero's rendering of
that Greek term with the Latin evidentia. L 'evidence is shorthand for the clear and distinct ideas of reason which are

incon trovertibly true.
Following Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolff, the Continental
rationalists (and many English writers, too) continually propounded the notion of clear and distinct ideas. Sometimes,
as in Descartes, the "clear and distinct" ideas of reason were
separated from the "obscure and confused" ideas of sense.
Most of the popular logics of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries included long discussions of the nature of clear,
distinct, and vivid ideas.
In Germany, Leibniz and Wolff constructed a whole
chart of ideas. "Knowledge is either obscure or clear; clear
ideas again are either indistinct or distinct; distinct ideas are
either adequate or inadequate, symbolic or intuitive; perfect
knowledge, fmally, is that which is both adequate and intuitive" (Leibniz, in Wiener, 1951 :283). According to these
philosophers, if we follow the proper procedure, we progress
from obscure and confused ideas to clear and distinct ideas.
This progress from "dunckeler Begrif" to "klarer Begrif"
prOvided the often overlooked technical meaning for the origin
of the term "Enlightenment." As we move from "dark" to
"clear" concepts, we use the light of reason to enlighten our
knowledge.
A quotation from a popular French book on logic, that
was also translated into English, will reveal all of the common
synonyms for enargeia used in a brief passage. Jean Pierre de
Crousaz (1724, 2 :3) wrote:
The Distinction of Ideas into clear and obscure,
distinct and confused, offers itself first. And indeed it is one of the most usual and important
Distinctions. . . . Every Idea is an Act, which
perceives itself; and therefore it has essentially
some Life and some Activity; it affects us with
some Force. Since it is known and perceived, it
has some Clearness, some Evidence . . . . I grant
that all our Ideas do not discover to us their
Objects with the same Clearness and the same
Exactness . . . . Wherefore every.. Idea has essentially some Clearness and some Distinctness; but
the most lively, that is, those which are best perceived, are the clearest, and for that reason the
most distinct. We distinguish more easily what
makes a more lively Impression upon us, because
it raises a greater Attention. Thus Clearness and
Distinctness are two different Characters; but one
of them is always a Consequence of the other.
In this passage, clearness, distinctness, vividness, and
evidence are all variations on our old rhetorical term, enargeia.
Force and liveliness are two terms that were often used as
substitutes for vividness.

If we tum to the British philosophers of the eighteenth
century, we will find that they, too, used the Cartesian cri157

terion in a modified fonn, but applied it to sense impressions
rather than intellectual concepts. Hume (1888:1) was very
concerned with trying to differentiate between impressions
and ideas. The very first paragraph of his Treatise begins:
All the perceptions of the hurnan mind resolve
themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall
call Impressions and Ideas. The difference betwixt
these consists in the degrees of force and
with which they strike upon the mind and make
their way into our thought or consciousness.
In Hurne's analysis there are three kinds of perceptions;
they are differentiated by their force, vivacity, or liveliness.
Sensations are the most vivid; ideas of memory have less
vivacity; and ideas of the imagination are the least vivid. "And
as an idea of memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may
degenerate to such a degree as to be taken for an idea of the
imagination; so on the other hand an idea of the imagination
may acquire such a force and vivacity as to pass for an idea
of the memory ...." (Hurne, 1888 :86).
Iri discussing the different force of ideas, Hume also
reverts to the tenn "distinct" and the imagery of color so
familiar to us. "'Tis evident at first sight, that the ideas of the
memory are much more lively and strong than those of the
imagination, and that the fonner facwty paints its object in
more distinct colours, than any which are employ'd by the
latter" (Hume, 18889).
Hume's definition of belief or assent is dependent on
his adaptation of the Cartesian criterion of truth. "Thus it
appears, that the belief or assent, which always attends the
memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them
from the imagination" (Hume, 1888:86). Hume states his
definition of belief as follows:
When you wou'd any way vary the idea of a particular object, you can only increase or diminish
its force and vivacity .... An opinion, therefore,
or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LNELY IDEA RELATED TO OR ASSOCIATED
WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION (Hume, 1886:
96).
Hume, obviously, felt some discomfort with his definition of belief as consisting in the vivacity of ideas. In an appendix to the Treatise, Hume (1888:628) adds the following
corrective passage:

This operation of the mind, which fonns the belief
in any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been
one of the greatest mysteries of philosophy ....
For my part I must own, that I find a considerable
difficwty in the case .... I am at a loss to express
my meaning. . .. An opinion or belief is nothing
158

but an idea, that is different from a fiction, not
in the nature, or the order of its parts, but in the
manner of its being conceiv'd. But when I wou'd
explain this manner, I scarce fmd any word that
fully answers the case . . . . An idea assented to
feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy
alone presents to us. And this different feeling I
endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force,
or vivacity, or solidity, or finnness or steadyness .... And in philosophy we can go no farther,
than assert, that it is something felt by the mind,
which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment
from the fictions of the imagination.
It seems that the young Scotsman was unaware that his
solution to "one of the -greatest mysteries of philosophy" was
a very old one indeed. Both the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers had assumed that all knowledge came from sense
perceptions. Epicurus ''has aisthesis serve as the guarantor
of its own validity, and this by reason of its clear and selfevident nature,(enargeia ..•)" (peters, 1967:52). When Hume
compares the greater vividness of ideas assented to with the
less vivid fictions of the imagination, he has returned to the
old criterion of enargeia.
Hume's opponent, Reid (1969:618) cowd not agree
with Hume that ''to believe in the existence of anything, is
nothing else than to have a strong and lively conception of
it." But in his attempt to combat Hurne's scepticism, Reid
argued for a large class of intuitive judgments or propositions
that need no argument to support them. These intuitive judgments or self.evident principles, he often refers to as the principles of Common Sense. Reid admits that since the time of
Descartes, philosophers have tried to get along with as few
self.evident judgments as possible. He was convinced, however,
that the classes of intuitive judgments had to be widened in
order to combat Hume's scepticism. In describing some of
the principles of common sense, Reid (1969:559) claims that
they have l'evidence and therefore do not need to be proven:
"All knowledge, and all science, must be built upon principles
that are self-evident; and of such principles, every man who
has common sense is a competent judge when he conceives
them distinctly." In discussing some of the first principles
that he introduces directly to combat his interpretation of
Hurne's scepticism, Reid uses variation of distinctness as a
criterion of truth. To guarantee the testimony of memory,
Reid (1969 :622) relies on the first principle, ''that those
things did really happen which I distinctly remember." The
existence of objects in the world and veridical perception is
assured by the first principle that ''those things do really .
exist which we distinctly perceive by our sense, and are what
we perceive them to be" (Reid, 1969:625).
It is rather ironic that philosophers of such differing
outlooks and with such different philosophies as Descartes;
Hume, and Reid all used concepts derived from the old rhe)
torical and philosophical tenn enargeia. No doubt, one cow'"

write a long history of this idea as Lovejoy did on the Great
Chain of Being, or Monk did on The Sublime. Suffice it to
say that enargeia played a significant role in rhetoric, poetry,
and philosophy. In poetic theory, vivid descriptions were
advocated by literary theorists because they provided aesthetic
pleasure, commanded attention, operated on the emotions,
and were longer remembered. In rhetorical theory, orators
were enjoined to set things before the audience's eyes, to paint
in living colors, to describe vividly, and to give an ocular
demonstration of the facts. The goal, of course, was not only
to hold the hearer's attention and interest or to arouse the
emotions, but also to get the audience to see and believe the
speaker's proposition. Among philosophers, the various
synonyms and derivatives of enargeia were often used as
criteria for truth or belief.

Reid, Thomas. 1969. Essays on the intellectual powers of man.
Cambridge, M.LT. Press.
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